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Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment
of People with Mental Illness in Eastern
Europe: Construing International

Human Rights Law*
Bruce J. Winick**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The plight of mental patients in Eastern Europe, and in Hungary in particular, was the subject of a recent conference at New York Law School. A
variety of abusive practices were documented by some of the speakers, some
of whom were Eastern Europeans themselves, and some of whom were lawyers seeking to protect the rights of patients in these areas.' These abuses
include the use of locked bed cages in Hungarian psychiatric facilities, also
known as net beds, in which patients are restrained at night, and perhaps for
periods during the day. 2 They include the use of unmodified electroconvulsive
therapy administered for punitive purposes. 3 They also include the isolation of
patients in overcrowded social care homes located in rural areas, thereby cutting off patients from people in their communities. 4 They include as well abusive practices by guardians, who instead of seeking to promote the best
interests of their wards, commit them to these isolated social care facilities on
5
a "voluntary" basis.
Many facilities offer unsanitary living conditions containing rooms that
smell of urine and feces. 6 Patients lack privacy, living in rooms that are inca* Copyright 2002 by Bruce J. Winick.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to thank

Michael Perlin for inviting him to think about these issues, Halina Cegielski, a December, 2002,
University of Miami School of Law graduate who herself grew up in Eastern Europe, for her
able research assistance, and Edgardo Rotman, the University of Miami School of Law International Law Librarian, for his assistance with international materials.
1. See generally Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 339 (2002) [hereinafter Symposium Transcript].
2. One of the net beds was found at Ludanyhalaszi Care Home with a patient living inside.
The cage was 2.08 m by 0.93 m, covered with net, and set on a metal construction 1.26 m in
height. Gabor Gombos et al., Hungary: The Social Care Home Report, id. at 361.
3. Symposium Transcript, supra note 1, at -- ; see also Personal communication from
Michael L. Perlin to Bruce J. Winick, Sept. 27, 2002 (on file with the author).
4. Gombos et al., supra note 2. According to the Ministry of Health Regulations, every
patient should have an area of 6 square meters and there should be no more than four patients in
a room. Id. In reality, there are social care homes providing patients with a space of 2.5 square
meters and that have rooms with 12 or more beds.
5. Remarks of Michael L. Perlin, Symposium Transcript, supra note 1, at 340-348.
6. Gombos et al., supra note 2.
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pable of being locked. 7 They lack conjugal rights. 8 Their ability to communicate with those outside is highly restricted or forbidden altogether, and both
incoming and outgoing mail is opened by facility staff.9 Phone calls are either
limited or not permitted.' 0 These facilities do not offer adequate medical or
dental care for their patients.' Patients frequently remain uninformed concerning their rights and often lack the ability to complain about their treatment. 12 Over-medication of patients and lack of appropriate medication has
been reported in other parts of Eastern Europe. This might occur in Hungary
as well.' 3 Many diagnosed as mentally disabled are permanently institutionalized in Hungarian psychiatric facilities, although perhaps 50% of them could
4
live safely in the community with suitable care. '
These abuses are reminiscent of the state of American mental health facilities thirty-five or more years ago. As we ponder the abuses in Eastern Europe
and wonder what can be done to put an end to them, it may be useful to
remind ourselves about the American experience. Prior to the mid-1960s the
abuses existing in many state mental hospitals in America remained largely
invisible, and the courts took a "hands off' approach to scrutinizing civil commitment issues. 15 Up until the modern era, mental hospitals were run by medical superintendents with little interference by the courts.16 Before the 1960s,
commitment was based on a physician's certificate of need. 17
Commitment at this time was based on a medical model, but a legal
model of civil commitment was beginning to emerge. ' 8 The civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s produced a new generation of lawyers dedicated to
pursuing the constitutional rights of racial minorities and other disadvantaged
7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Debra Benko & Brittany Benowitz, The Application of Universal Human Rights Law to
People with Mental Disabilities, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 9. 10 (2001).
14. Id. at 9.
15. See Alexander D. Brooks & Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Mental DisabilityLaw Comes
of Age, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 235, 236 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974);
JAMES

B.

JACOBS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES:

HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS AND MILITARY XXIV

PRISONS, MENTAL

(1979).

16. Paul. S. Appelbaum & Kathleen N. Kemp, The Evolution of Commitment Law in the
Nineteenth Century: A Reinterpretation, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 343, 344 (1982).
17. Bruce J. Winick, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceModel for Civil Commitment, in INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND CIVIL COMMITMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Ian Freckleton
& Kate Diesfeld eds., forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter TJ Model]; Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 39 (1999)
[hereinafter Civil Commitment Hearing]; Sumner J. Sydeman et al., ProceduralJustice in the
Context of Civil Commitment: A Critique of Tyler's Analysis, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
207, 207 (1997).
18. Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17.
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populations. 9 Public interest lawyers soon championed the rights of those
with mental illness, filing lawsuits challenging the conditions at state mental
hospitals. 2 0 These cases dramatized and brought to public attention the abysmal conditions and lack of treatment that characterized the institutions of the
time. 2' Legislation tightened up civil commitment standards and provided for
22
procedural due process hearings to determine whether they were satisfied.
23
The legal model for civil commitment thus replaced the medical model.
In some ways, the American experience is now being replicated in Eastern Europe. Organizations, such as Mental Disability Rights International, are
championing the rights of those with mental illness in these countries, dramatizing the existence of abuses and asserting their rights in the courts. 24 Thus,
we are seeing the beginning of a transformation of mental health law in Eastern Europe from a medical to a legal model.
As the new legal model takes shape, many questions will emerge concerning the legal rights of patients in Eastern Europe. A variety of international human rights provisions and principles will guide the direction of
reform, and there will be increasing interest in the meaning of these provisions. Since many are vaguely worded, courts will be called upon to construe
them. This process will roughly parallel the American experience in which
American courts were called upon to interpret the similarly vague constitu19. Brooks & Winick, supra note 15, at 236.
20. Id.; see also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 334 F.
Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and remanded in part sub nom; Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974); David
Rothman, The Courts and Social Reform: A Postprogressive Outlook, 6 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
113 (1982); Patricia Wald & Paul Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy in the
United States, I INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137, 147 (1978).
21. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 334 F. Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded in part sub nom; Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) (due process
imposes on mental disability institutions the following minimum standards: "(1) a humane psychological and physical environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer
adequate treatment and (3) individualized treatment plans."); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 836 (1979) (rights in institutions for the mentally retarded); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd in part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), previousjudgment aff'd, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Welsch v. Likens, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974), aff'd in part and remanded, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
22. Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 39. Substantive and procedural
limits on commitment were also imposed by the courts. E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on
remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421
U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis 1976).
23. Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 39-40.
24. Mental Disability Rights International ("MDRI"), established in 1993, is a non-governmental organization, devoted to the enforcement and international recognition of the rights of
people with mental disabilities. MDRI documents and publishes reports about human rights
abuses in Eastern Europe and Latin America. See http://www.mdri.org (last visited Nov. 15,
2002).
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tional rights of those with mental illness. 25 In America, the constitutionalization of much of mental health law occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. By the
late 1980s, as the Supreme Court grew more conservative, it was clear that
mental health law had reached a point in its development when the Constitution would no longer be its driving force. 2 6 Mental health law needed a new
paradigm, and as a result, therapeutic jurisprudence was born. 27 In the past
fifteen years, mental health law in America has begun to shift from a legal to a
therapeutic jurisprudence model that seeks to strike an appropriate balance
28
between the legal rights and therapeutic needs of patients.
If developments in mental health law in Eastern Europe follow the path
of the American experience, the task of construing the various international
human rights provisions that place limits on how those with mental illness are
treated will be guided by principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. After
describing the approach of therapeutic jurisprudence, this Article will suggest
how its principles can be used in the effort to end abuses in the mental health
system in Eastern Europe and to reshape international human rights law and
practice in this area.
II.

A

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT

Therapeutic jurisprudence grew out of the scholarly work in mental
health law that David Wexler and I each had been doing during the 1970s and
1980s. In our individual work, Wexler and I often criticized American mental
health law doctrines and cases, not only using the usual tools of legal scholarship - case analysis and statutory and constitutional construction - but also
insights from psychiatry, psychology, and sociology to condemn their antitherapeutic effects, and to suggest reforms that would improve the mental health
of the individuals affected. 29 We were concerned that mental health law
scholarship, as it was then being practiced, was insufficiently interdisciplinary
in character, and that mental health law, as it then existed, was too doctrinal,
constitutional, and rights-oriented. 30 American mental health law from the
1960s to the 1980s had largely focused on an attempt to apply to people with
mental illness the constitutional rights that had been extended to criminal defendants and prisoners by the U.S. Supreme Court during the period when Earl
25. Brooks & Winick, supra note 15, at 237.
26. DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK,

ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

5

(1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS].
27. Id. at 7-8; DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC AGENT].

28. Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17; Bruce J Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. (forthcoming 2003).
29. WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 26, at x; e.g., David B. Wexler, CriminalCommitment Contingency Structures, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 121 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1977); Bruce J. Winick, PsychotropicMedication and
Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 769.
30. WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 26, at 3.
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Warren was chief justice. 3 1 American mental health law at that point was part
of a civil liberties revolution that had started in the civil rights struggle of the
1960s. 32 It had developed principally to correct the abuses of state psychiatric
power that then existed. 33 As originally conceptualized, civil commitment
was based on a medical model in which deference was given to the expertise
of psychiatrists or other physicians, who without effective judicial review,
were authorized to commit patients based upon an assessment of whether their
best interests required care and treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 34 This
medical model granted too much deference to physicians to make the essentially legal determination of when an individual's fundamental liberty could be
taken away. Perhaps predictably, it had produced arbitrary and sometimesunnecessary deprivations of liberty for unnecessarily long periods of time. Patients were held, often indefinitely, in under-staffed and under-funded hospitals that functioned more as human warehouses than as treatment facilities.
Injecting the Constitution into the mental health system thus seemed an
appropriate remedy to correct these abuses. But as the Supreme Court grew
more conservative, mental health law scholarship and reform ran out of steam
and seemed to lack direction. 35 David Wexler and I, therefore, thought that
future reforms in mental health law required disentangling mental health law
from its overwhelming dependence on American constitutional law. 36 We felt
that it was time to put mental health back into mental health law. 37 A legal

model of civil commitment had replaced the medical model, and it brought
significant reforms. By severely restricting the standards for commitment and
providing for hearings to increase the accuracy of their application, the legal
model had already eliminated much of the arbitrariness of the medical model,
significantly limited the category of individuals subject to hospitalization, and
placed much needed emphasis on protecting the legal rights of the mentally
disabled. The legal model had limited much of the restrictiveness of mental
hospitals and the duration of commitment, protected the rights of patients
within the institutions, limited the abuses of involuntary treatment, and
brought public and judicial concerns to institutional abuses that resulted in
their curtailment, and ultimately produced pressures that helped to lead to
38
deinstitutionalization.
The advances of converting civil commitment from a medical to a legal
model had largely been achieved. Further reforms seemed unlikely to be obtainable through a scholarly and law reform approach that was exclusively
31. Id. at4.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id.
34. Sydeman et a]., supra note 17; Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at

39.
35.
36.
37.
38.

WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 26, at 3-5.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 3.
Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17.
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rights-based in its orientation. We saw the interdisciplinary approach that
grew out of our own individual scholarship - which focused attention on the
impact of mental health law on the psychological well-being of the patients it
affected - as a new paradigm for mental health law scholarship and law reform. 39 We came to call this approach "therapeutic jurisprudence."
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to legal scholarship and law reform that sees law itself as a therapeutic agent. 40 Legal rules,
legal practices, and the way legal actors (such as judges, lawyers, and expert
witnesses testifying in court) play their roles impose inevitable consequences
on the mental health and emotional well-being of those affected. Therapeutic
jurisprudence advocates the study of these consequences with the tools of the
behavioral sciences so that we can better understand law and how it applies,
and can reshape it to minimize its anti-therapeutic effects and maximize its
therapeutic potential. It is interdisciplinary in that it brings insights from psychology and the social sciences to bear on legal questions. It is empirical in
that it calls for the testing of hypotheses concerning how the law functions and
can be improved.
Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that law should value psychological
health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law, should
attempt to bring about psychological well-being. Unlike the medical model, it
does not privilege therapeutic values over others. Rather, it seeks to ascertain
whether the law's anti-therapeutic effects can be reduced and its therapeutic
effects enhanced without subordinating due process and other justice values. 4 1
Therapeutic jurisprudence does not suggest that therapeutic considerations
should outweigh other considerations. Law often serves other ends that are
equally or more important. Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks convergence between therapeutic and other values, and suggests that such convergence is the
path to true law reform. 42 When therapeutic and other values served by law
conflict, therapeutic jurisprudence cannot resolve the conflict. Rather, therapeutic jurisprudence helps to make this conflict more visible and sharpens the
issues for further debate. Sometimes therapeutic considerations may strongly
outweigh other values, and thus point the way to law reform. Although the
weighing of therapeutic against other values may be a task that some might
describe as weighing apples and oranges, it is possible to weigh differing val39. See generally
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS,

supra note 26;

APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW

BRUCE J. WINICK, THERA-

(1997) [hereinafter

JURIS-

PRUDENCE APPLIED].

40.

WEXLER &WINICK, ESSAYS,

supra note 26; see generally LAW

IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:

(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.,
JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED, supra note 39.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

1996) [hereinafter

THERAPEUTIC KEY]; WINICK,

41. WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 26; WEXLER & WINICK, THERAPEUTIC KEY,
supra note 40; Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 184, 185 (1997).
42. Id.; WINICK, JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED, supra note 39.
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ues, even those thought of as incommensurable. 4 3 When therapeutic and other
normative values do not converge, creative solutions can often be found that
permit maximized balancing among such values with a minimization of
conflict.

44

Therapeutic jurisprudence, therefore, is a scholarly approach for bringing
45
mental health insights into the development and reshaping of law.
Therapeutic jurisprudence has emerged as one of the most important influences on mental health law. 46 Since its inception in the late 1980s, it has
gone considerably beyond mental health law and has spread across the legal
landscape, emerging as a mental health approach to law generally. 4 7 Moreover, therapeutic jurisprudence has become increasingly international in
character.

48

Therapeutic jurisprudence thus examines legal rules, legal practices, and
the roles of legal actors to assess their therapeutic impact and to see how they
can be revamped to increase therapeutic outcomes.
As previously mentioned, the medical model of civil commitment has
been replaced in America over the last fifty years with a legal model. Although grounded in paternalism and principles of beneficence, the medical
model produced significant abuses. In societies that celebrate the value of
individual liberty, the question of when it can be justifiably taken away must
be regarded as a legal, rather than a medical, question. 49 Applying a medical
model for civil commitment, therefore, was inappropriate. The legal model
represents a significant advance, but it has its own limitations. Its exclusive
focus on protecting the legal rights of patients sometimes prevents appropriate
consideration of patient needs. 50 Therapeutic jurisprudence has been an attempt to remedy this deficiency by taking mental health law scholarship and
law reform beyond an exclusively rights-based legal model. It calls for mental
health laws and practices that not only respect patients' rights, but also their
clinical and human needs. It seeks to strike an appropriate balance between
43. Ken Kress, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Resolution of Value Conflicts: What We

can Realistically Expect, in Practice,from Theory, 17

BEHAV.

Sci. & L. 555, 566-87 (1999).

44. Id.; Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69

U. Mo.K.C. L. REV. 33, 79 (2000).
45. See generally Carrie J. Petrucci et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Invitation to So-

cial Scientists, in

THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS

& Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2003).
46. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN

(2000).
47.

PREJUDICE:

MENTAL

579-601 (David Carson

DISABILITY

ON TRIAL

261

WEXLER & WINICK, ESSAYS, supra note 26.
48. See Symposium, International Perspectives on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Part 1, 17
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 553, 553-696 (Allan J. Tomkins & David Carson eds., 1999); see also Symposium, InternationalPerspectives on TherapeuticJurisprudence,Part 11, 18 BEHAV. ScI. & L.
411-556 (Allan J. Tomkins & David Carson eds., 2000).
49. See generally WINICK, JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED, supra note 39, at ch. 4.

50. Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17.
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legal and therapeutic considerations. 5 1 As a result, a therapeutic jurisprudence
model for civil commitment has emerged, one that is more interdisciplinary in
health law and apply it in ways that
character and that seeks to reshape mental
52
are more consonant with patient needs.
III.

CONSTRUING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW THROUGH THE
RESOLVING VAGUENESS IN THE

LENS OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:

EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

The basic insight of a therapeutic jurisprudence model for civil commitment is that legal rules in the commitment area and how they are applied by
judges, lawyers, and clinicians can have an important impact on the mental
health and psychological well-being of the patient. Therapeutic jurisprudence
considerations frequently will converge with many of the principles underlying international human rights protections for those with mental illness, such
as the protection of liberty against arbitrary deprivation and a commitment to
procedural fairness. When such convergence occurs, therapeutic jurisprudence can provide insights about how these principles should be applied.
Even in areas in which international human rights law remains unsettled, therapeutic jurisprudence principles can point the way to law reform. By their
nature, international human rights principles constitute somewhat vague commitments to shared values. This vagueness places the burden on international
courts construing these international human rights provisions to spell out what
they mean in particular circumstances. When it can be shown that a particular
construction or application of an international human rights principle governing those with mental illness will have strong therapeutic advantages, in the
absence of countervailing considerations that are highly valued by international law principles, international human rights law should move in the direction of being construed and applied so as to achieve therapeutic aims and
avoid antitherapeutic effects.
A therapeutic jurisprudence model for civil commitment would raise several fundamental questions: What are the therapeutic consequences of defining civil commitment criteria in differing ways? What kinds of procedural
rights should be accorded patients in the civil commitment process, and what
is the impact of the civil commitment hearing on the mental health of those
sought to be committed? Should those subjected to civil commitment enjoy a
right to treatment? Should those subjected to civil commitment thereby be
barred from exercising other rights, such as to manage their property or to vote
during the period of their commitment? International human rights law should
address these and other related questions, and should do so with a sensitivity
51. Id. at 5 (presenting a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of mental health law that seeks
convergence between legal and therapeutic values).
52. Id. at 4.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

2002]

545

to the fact that its responses will have inevitable effects on the mental health of
those affected.
In this section, I will examine these questions through an analysis of the
most important international human rights decision in the area of mental health
law in Europe, the 1979 decision of the European Court of Human Rights in
Winterwerp v. The Netherlands.53 There are, of course, a variety of other important civil commitment issues that could be analyzed through the lens of
therapeutic jurisprudence, 54 but this Article will be limited to an analysis of
the above questions, which were dealt with, at least preliminarily, in the
Winterwerp decision. Let us, then, turn to a consideration of the Winterwerp
case, the most important decision construing the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' provisions dealing
with the rights of those with mental illness.
A.

The FactualBackground of Winterwerp v. The Netherlands

In 1968, Fritz Winterwerp, a resident of The Netherlands, was committed
55
to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to an emergency commitment procedure.
Six weeks later, the local court continued his hospitalization based on an application for commitment filed by his wife. 56 The reviewing court renewed the
commitment order from year to year as a result of his wife's further applications and those of the public prosecutor, basing its actions on medical reports
from the doctors who treated him. Winterwerp never received a hearing on
these recommitment decisions, nor notice of the court orders, and never re57
ceived legal assistance.
Indeed, Dutch law at the time did not require that patients be notified of
requests for their commitment, of physicians' applications in support of their
need for hospitalization, or of the proceedings relating thereto. 58 Apart from
being required to hear the public prosecutor, an administrative official, the
court, and the reviewing court, were not required to follow any particular procedure. 59 Although it could have called for evidence or witnesses, heard the
patient, granted him or her legal assistance, and consulted experts, the court
need not have done any of these. 60 The court's decision, which need not have
been furnished to the individual committed, did not need to occur at a public
53. 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387 (1979).
54. For a consideration of other such issues, including the medical appropriateness principle, the least restrictive alternative principle, conditional release, voluntary hospitalization, the
right to refuse treatment, the use of advance directive instruments for those with mental illness,
and outpatient commitment, among others, see Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17.
55. Winterwerp, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 391.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Jd.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.

546
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hearing and was not subject to appeal. 6 1 Notification to the patient was left
62
entirely to the discretion of the hospital and treated as a medical question.
The law at the time allowed the patient to petition for release or partial
release, and the public prosecutor, with the agreement of the doctor in charge
of the institution, could order the patient's discharge if continued confinement
was deemed unnecessary. 63 If the doctor disagreed with the patient's request
for release, the public prosecutor could refer the matter to court. 6 4 At the
expiration of the period covered by the commitment order, the hospital was
required to inform the public prosecutor, who could request continued commitment based on a certification by the doctor in charge of the institution, that
the patient's release would present a danger to public order. 65 Under the law
at the time, an individual committed to a psychiatric hospital would automatically lose the legal capacity to administer his or her property. 66 As a result,
the individual could no longer contract, transfer property, or otherwise manage
his or her assets. 67 Legal capacity to manage property was restored only following discharge. 68 During the period of confinement, the court could appoint
69
a guardian to manage the patient's property.
Less than a year prior to his commitment, Winterwerp had received approximately six months of voluntary treatment at a psychiatric hospital, appar70
ently as a result of brain damage he had previously sustained in an accident.
The events precipitating his commitment involved his detention by the police
for stealing documents from a governmental office and his being found naked
in a bed in a police cell. 7 1 The doctor's application accompanying his wife's
petition alleged that he was "'a schizophrene, suffering from imaginary and
Utopian ideas, who has for a fairly long time been destroying himself as well
as his family' and that he 'is unaware of his morbid condition.'- 72 The court,
in response, authorized Winterwerp's provisional detention without holding a
73
hearing or seeking any expert advice.
His commitment was extended from year to year, again without a hearing, based on medical records from Winterwerp's treating physicians stating
that he suffered from "schizophrenic and paranoiac reactions" and had in the
74
past performed irresponsible acts "without appreciating their consequences.
61. Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.

73. Id.

74. Id. at 397-399.
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Winterwerp had made several requests for discharge, the first of which the
public prosecutor referred to the court, giving him a hearing at the hospital
before denying his request. 75 Thereafter, his subsequent requests were denied
after meetings with the public prosecutor. 76 In his requests for discharge,
Winterwerp had asserted that he was "not mentally deranged, that he had been
falsely accused of misdemeanors and that he did not constitute a danger to
himself or to others." 7
During his nine years of hospitalization, Winterwerp was allowed a number of leaves of absence from the hospital for periods of several months on an
experimental basis. 78 Each time he was readmitted to the hospital, apparently
79
because he had failed to take his medication.
In addition to asserting that his commitment was arbitrary and without
procedural regularity, Winterwerp alleged denial of "the right to appropriate
treatment in order to ensure that he is not detained longer than absolutely necessary." 80 He asserted that, at the hospital his meetings with the psychiatrist
were "too short and infrequent and that the medication administered to him
was unduly made up of tranquilizers."' 8 1 He also claimed that his automatic
loss of capacity to administer his property constituted a determination of a
82
civil right without an appropriate judicial procedure.
B.

The Meaning of "Unsound Mind" as a Justifying Conditionfor
Civil Commitment

Winterwerp asserted that he had been deprived of his liberty in violation
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 8 3 Article 5 of the European Convention is a broad protection of the liberty and security of the person.8 4 Section 5(1) restricts the
85
circumstances under which a government may deprive a person of liberty.
Subsection 5 (1)(e) authorizes detention of persons for the purpose of preventing the spread of infectious disease, of persons with "unsound mind," of alcoholics or drug addicts, or of vagrants.8 6 The Convention does not define the
term "unsound mind," and the Winterwerp court noted that the "term is not
75. Id. at 399.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id.

82. Id. at 412.
83. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocols 3, 5 and 8, entered into force on Sept.
21 1970, Dec. 20, 1971 and Jan. 1, 1990 respectively [hereinafter Convention].
84. Id. § 5; see generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 23 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 125 (2000).
85. Convention, supra note 83 § 5(1).
86. Id. § 5 (l)(e).
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one that can be given a definitive interpretation."'8 7 Rather, the court stated, "it
is a term whose meaning is continually evolving as research in psychiatry
progresses, an increasing flexibility in treatment is developing and society's
attitudes to mental illness change . . . . 88 The court, however, provided some
clarification. The term, the court found, could not justify "the detention of a
person simply because his views or behavior deviate from the norms prevailing in a particular society."8 9 The term, the court noted, should be given a
"narrow interpretation," in a manner that would achieve the Covenant's purpose, to prevent deprivations of liberty "in an arbitrary fashion." 90
The court rejected Winterwerp's contention that his commitment had
been arbitrary. Dutch law at the time had authorized civil commitment based
upon a medical declaration that the patient is in a state of "mental illness" (a
term not defined), and that it is necessary or desirable to treat him or her in a
psychiatric hospital. 9 ' In addition, the court noted that under the practice then
followed, commitment was authorized only if the individual's mental disorder
was "of such a kind or of such gravity as to make him an actual danger to
himself or to others."' 92 In principle, therefore, the court found that Netherlands' law was in conformity with the Convention. 93 Turning to the facts of
Winterwerp's case, the court agreed that "no one may be confined as 'a person
of unsound mind' in the absence of medical evidence establishing that his
mental state is such as to justify his compulsory hospitalization," and that this
calls for "objective medical expertise" finding that the mental disorder is "of a
kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. '94 Furthermore, the court
concluded that "the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder." 95 Finding no reason to question the "objectivity
and reliability of the medical evidence" showing that Winterwerp had suffered
from "schizophrenic and paranoiac reactions" of which he was unaware, and
that on several occasions he had committed "some fairly serious acts without
appreciating their consequences," the court rejected his contention that his
confinement failed to meet the "unsound mind" requirement of the Convention. 96 Moreover, because it found that "gradual rehabilitation into society
had failed," the court concluded that his continued confinement did not violate
97
Article 5(l)(e).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 387,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 401-402.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 402-403.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id.

37 (1979).
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Although the European Court of Human Rights thus provided some clarification concerning the meaning of the term "unsound mind," its analysis
could have gone considerably further. There must be mental illness objectively diagnosed, we are told, and it must be "of a kind or degree warranting
compulsory confinement." The implication is that mental illness, although a
necessary condition for civil commitment, is not a sufficient one. However,
the court provided little guidance concerning when such illness is "of a kind or
degree warranting compulsory confinement." Although mental illness causing
the individual to be a danger to himself or others, the requirement under Dutch
law at the time, would meet the test, the court did not clearly require that this
standard be met in order to satisfy Article 5 (l)(e). The court's Winterwerp
decision, therefore, leaves the contours of "unsound mind" substantially unexplored, and subsequent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have
98
shed little light on the question.
The term "unsound mind" seems rather archaic, but we must recall that
this language was chosen for use as a limitation on deprivations of liberty in
1953, when the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms was adopted. 99 What was the common understanding
of the term "unsound mind" at that time? Winterwerp tells us that the meaning of the term is not frozen, but can change over time with advances in psychiatry, 1°° and this is a most significant insight. But the inquiry should start
with the question of what "unsound mind" must have been understood to mean
in the early 1950s and earlier, when those who drafted and negotiated the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms developed their own ideas about the kind of mental disorder that
would justify involuntary hospitalization. The term is found in Article 341 of
the English Lunacy Act of 1890, which authorized the commitment of a person who was a "lunatic," defined as "an idiot or person of unsound mind."'' °
Law dictionaries of the time shed considerable light on what may have been
the common understanding of the term "unsound mind." Byrne's DICTIONARY
OF ENGLISH LAW, published in 1927, defined "unsound mind" by referring the
reader to "idiocy, insanity, lunacy, lunatic, mental deficiency, and non-compos
98. In X v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 188, 202 (1982), the court declared: "In its
Winterwerp judgment, the court stated three minimum conditions which have to be satisfied in
order for there to be 'the lawful detention of a person of unsound mind' within the meaning of
Article 5 (1) (e): except in emergency cases, the individual concerned must be reliably shown
to be of unsound mind, that is to say, a true mental disorder must be established before a
competent authority on the basis of objective medical expertise; the mental disorder must be of
a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and the validity of continued confinement
depends upon the persistence of such a disorder."
99. Convention, supra note 83.
100. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 401 (1979).
101. Lunacy Act of 1890, art. 341, XXVII THE LAW REPORTS (STATUTES) 106 (1890). A
leading dictionary of English law in the period, cites the Lunacy Act of 1890 definition of
"lunatic" in its definition of the term "unsound mind." W. J. BYRNE, DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH

LAW 551 (1923, 1990).
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"mentis."' 0 2 Moreover, "idiot" is defined as a person "who from his birth, by
a perpetual or incurable infirmity, is of unsound mind."' 0 3 Today we would
use the term "mental retardation" instead of "idiot." According to this dictionary, the term "lunatic" was used in law in three senses. It denoted "a person
who has attacks of intermittent insanity separated by lucid intervals, or suffers
from delusion."' 4 It also referred to a person "who from unsoundness of
mind is incapable of managing himself or his affairs ...

."105 In addition, it

referred to "a person detained in an asylum on account of unsoundness of
mind." '

0 6

STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES,

published in

England in 1953, defined "unsound mind" as "depravity of reason, or want of
it.'

1° 7

THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW,

published in 1959, defined "per-

sons of unsound mind" as persons afflicted with a mental illness affecting their
reason . . . , as distinguished from idiots, imbeciles, feeble minded persons,
and moral defectives .... "101o Finally, let us examine an American entry of
the period, the edition of BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY published in 1957, which

defined a "person of unsound mind" as "one from whom infirmity of mind is
incapable of managing himself and his affairs," one who is "incapable of un10 9
derstanding and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life."
These dictionary definitions suggest a concept of "unsound mind" that
equates with mental illness of a variety of kinds, and that produces functional
impairment. Increasingly, the concept seems to be mental illness impairing
the individual's ability to manage his property or affairs, or impairing his reasoning ability. Functional impairment might not have been an essential component of the term "unsound mind" in the 19th Century, but it was
increasingly thought to be so by the middle of the 20th Century. Nineteenth
Century thinking about mental illness was based on the belief that mental illness automatically destroys decision-making capacity.' "0 At that time, people.
suffering from mental illness were regarded as globally incompetent, cognitively impaired in every area of functioning."'
102. BYRNE, supra note
103. Id.at 454.

101, at 902.

104. Id.at 551.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY OF WORDS AND PHRASES, 316 (John Burke ed., 1953).
108. THE DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW 1335 (Earl Jowitts & Clifford Walsh eds., 1959).
109. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1708 (4th ed. 1957).
110. E.g., Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study 1: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105,
107, 108 (1995); Issac Ray, American Legislation on Insanity, 21 AM. J. INSANITY 21 (1864-5);
Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and Therapeutic Impli-

cations, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137, 140 (1996) [hereinafter MacArthur Study]. The
U.S. Supreme Court's review of the historical origins of the competency to stand trial doctrine
in the criminal process cites several early 19th-century cases equating "insanity" with incompetence to stand trial. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360-361 (1996).
111. Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110, at 140.
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However, in the 20th Century, the law began to reject the notion that
mental illness produces an automatic and generalized incompetence, moving
instead in the direction of a presumption in favor of competence, even for
those with mental illness, and requiring an adjudication of incompetence to
perform a particular task or play a particular role before an individual could be
deemed incompetent to engage in the conduct in question."1 2 Under the modem conception, incompetency is not equated with mental illness, and is regarded as a functional and highly contextualized inquiry." 13 Indeed, in 1952,
just prior to the adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American National Institute of
Mental Health proposed a draft Act Governing the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, that conceptualized incompetency to consent to mental hospitalization
as loss of the power to make choices or confusion that renders the individual
unable to make a decision having any relation to the factors bearing on
hospitalization. 114
Thus, the conception of mental illness that was emerging at the time of
the adoption of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms regarded mental illness not as a uniform phenomenon that always produced a generalized functional incapacity, but rather as a
condition that sometimes does - but sometimes does not - impair functioning, and when it does so, often does not do so in a global fashion. "Unsound
mind," the archaic language used in the Convention, therefore cannot be
equated with mental illness, but seems to require a degree of functional impairment as well. When the Winterwerp court defined "unsound mind" as
5
it
mental illness "of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement,"'1
arguably was not simply delegating to psychiatrists the determination in individual cases of whether hospitalization was warranted. Rather, it was noting
that not all mental illness warrants compulsory confinement, but only that of a
certain "kind or degree," i.e., producing functional impairment that bears on
the need for hospitalization.
But what kind of functional impairment bears on the need for hospitalization? This question remains unexamined in Winterwerp. Yet it is the crucial
question in determining the "nature or degree" of unsoundness of mind that
would warrant hospitalization.
More recent developments in international human rights law begin to answer this question. In 1991, the United Nations adopted the Principlesfor the
Protectionof Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental
112. Id. at 151-53.
113. Id. at 152 & n.86.
114. NAT'L. INST. MENTAL HEALTH, DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL (1952) (commentary), cited in Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1201, 1217 (1974).

115. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 403 (1979).
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Health Care ("MI Principles").' 16 The MI Principles were adopted by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, and as such, are not directly binding on
member states. 117 However, they have strong persuasive force, representing,
as they do, the most detailed and comprehensive statement of international
8
principles governing the rights of those with mental illness."
MI Principle 16 deals with involuntary commitment.' 19 It limits involuntary hospitalization to people who have a mental illness diagnosed under internationally accepted medical standards. 120 In addition, it requires that there be
a serious likelihood of immediate harm to the person or others, or if the person
is severely mentally ill and has impaired judgment, a finding that there will be
serious impairment of the individual's condition is required. 12 1 The MI Principles thus seek to limit commitment to those whose mental illness presents an
imminent risk of serious harm to themselves or to others, or results in seriously impaired judgment that, without hospitalization, would lead to a serious
impairment in their condition. In short, the MI Principles authorize two differing kinds of commitment grounded in two different governmental purposes the police power interest in preventing harm to others, 122 and the parens patriae interest in preventing harm to an individual who is incompetent to pro23
tect himself or herself.'
When "unsound mind" or mental illness is the justification for depriving
the individual of liberty through involuntary commitment, it should be of such
a nature that it threatens public safety or produces significant functional impairment in ways that prevent the individual from exercising autonomy.1 24 To
suffice, the mental illness should be required to produce some resulting func116. Principlesfor the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness andfor the Improvement of
Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Annex, at 188-92,
U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) [hereinafter MI Principles].
117. Benko & Benowitz, supra note 13, at 9; Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advocacy under the "Principles for the Protection of Persons with
Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257, 268 (1993).
118. Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 117, at 259.
119. MI Principles, supra note 116, Principle 16.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The state's police power allows interventions to protect the public health and safety.
Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17; Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110, at 138; see Note,
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 122228 (1974).
123. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 296 (1982); see also JOEL FEINBERG, HARM To SELF
6 (1986) (analyzing parens patriaepower); Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17; Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110, at 138-39; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment:
The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 16 & n.3 (1991) (discussing scope of government's parens patriae power); Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331, 374 (1981) (examining government's
parens patriae power to make decisions for those who are unable to make decisions for themselves); Note, supra note 114, at 1207-22.
124. Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the Legal Meaning and Significance of Mental Illness,
I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 534, 567 (1995) [hereinafter Ambiguities].
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tional impairment in a way that relates to the justifications for involuntary
hospitalization. 2 5 The major mental illnesses that typically serve to justify
involuntary hospitalization - schizophrenia, major affective depression, and
bipolar disorder - would satisfy this condition. 126 They may render patients
incompetent to appreciate the need for hospitalization and to engage in rational
decision making about the question.' 2 7 They may also prevent patients from
28
controlling their conduct in ways that endanger themselves or others.'
Schizophrenia is a thought disorder that frequently produces hallucinations and delusions that distort reality and seriously interfere with rational decision-making. 29 Major depression and bipolar disorder produce alterations
in mood that may also seriously impair rational decision-making. 30 In addition, those with schizophrenia, major affective depression, and bipolar disorder may be unable to control their behavior, thus endangering themselves or
others. 131 Not all individuals suffering from these major mental illnesses will,
of course, be rendered cognitively or volitionally impaired in ways that justify
commitment.' 32 The extent of functional impairment produced by these disorders differs widely within each diagnostic category, with the result that assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specified level of impairment
or disability. 133 In making diagnoses, clinicians are expected to conduct a
separate inquiry into the patient's functional impairment. 34 These major
125. Id. at 568.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. "Schizophrenia ... includes at least I month of active-phase symptoms (i.e., two [or
more] of the following: delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or
catatonic behavior .... " AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 645 (4th ed. rev 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; "At some phase of the illness
Schizophrenia always involves delusions, hallucinations, or certain characteristic disturbances
in affect and the form of thought." AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 343 (3d ed. rev 1987).

130. Major depression is defined as one or more major depressive episodes, which involves
depressed mood for a period of at least two weeks accompanied by serious interference in
functioning. DSM-IV, supra note 129, at 339. Bipolar disorder is defined as one or more

manic episodes, characterized by elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, usually accompanied
by one or more major depressive episodes, accompanied by serious interference in functioning.
Id. at 350-51.
131. Some evidence suggests that the frequency of violent acts in schizophrenia may be
greater than in the general population. Id. at 280. Suicide attempts are greater for those suffering from major depression. ld. at 322. Mania may cause "marked impairment" requiring hospitalization "to protect the individual" or others. Id. at 329.
132. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 218 (1991) ("The mere presence of psychosis, dementia, mental retardation,
or some other form of mental illness or disability is insufficient to constitute incompetence.");
Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 578 (1978); Winick, Ambiguties, supra note 124, at 569.
133. DSM-IV, supra note 129, at XXIII.
134. See id. at 30 (Axis V permits the clinician to rate a person's psychological, social, and
occupational functioning on a scale, the Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF scale"), that
assesses mental health-illness).
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mental illnesses, in particular cases at least, may produce gross impairment of
1 35
functioning, which may justify involuntary commitment.
How "unsound" must an individual's mind be to justify civil commitment
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? When is mental illness "of a kind or degree" that would
warrant compulsory confinement? These questions, left substantially unresolved by the European Court of Human Rights in its Winterwerp decision,
can now be resolved if we take into account the civil commitment standards
set forth in the MI Principles and our present understanding about the nature
and effects of mental illness. To warrant compulsory confinement based on
mental illness or "unsound mind," it should be required that the individual
suffer from a condition that produces cognitive or volitional impairment that
renders the patient incompetent in ways that serve as one of the two justifications for involuntary commitment, i.e., that substantially impairs the patient's
self-control in a manner that creates an imminent risk of harm to the patient or
others, or that substantially impairs his or her ability to make rational decisions
about the need for care and treatment. Such a circumscribed conception of
"unsound mind" within the meaning of Article 5 (1)(e) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would
strike an appropriate balance between the values of individual liberty, beneficence, and societal protection.
Such a circumscribed conception of the mental illness that would justify
involuntary hospitalization also is supported by principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Hospitalization, although it can be beneficial for many suffering
from the major mental illnesses, is not beneficial for all of them, even many
who are severely mentally ill. The benefits that mental health treatment frequently produce can be provided in community facilities where the individual
can develop and practice the community living skills that are needed to accomplish the restoration to functional capacity that is the goal of any enlightened system of mental hospitalization.
Moreover, mental hospitalization, particularly if for a lengthy period, can
produce negative effects. For many patients, even those with serious mental
illness, hospitalization can be iatrogenic, creating an institutional dependency
that such facilities often condition in their inmates 36 and a form of learned
135. Winick, Ambiguities, supra note 124, at 569.
136. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3 (1961) (discussing the phenomenon of institutional dependence);
Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current
Debate and Outlining Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 139 (1992-93) (civil commitment statutes); Richard Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doctors' Rights: Which Should Take Precedent?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS: VALUES IN CONFLICT 59 (A.
Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982); Edmund G. Doherty, Labeling Effects in
Psychiatric Hospitalization: A Study of Diverging Patterns of Inpatient Self-Labeling Process,

32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 562-63 (1975); Catherine K. Riessman et al., Brief Versus Standard Psychiatric Hospitalization, 2 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH REV. 1, 9 (1977); see also
Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 308 (D. Md. 1979) ("Inappropriate and excessive hospi-
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helplessness that debilitates motivation and effective functioning and produces
a form of clinical depression. 137 Involuntary hospitalization in a psychiatric
facility is also seriously stigmatizing, causing not only lasting social and occupational disadvantages for the patient, 13 8 but also affecting his or her selfincompetency and that undermine
concept in ways that reinforce feelings of139
functioning and psychological well-being.
These anti-therapeutic E-ffects of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization
would be augmented for individuals subjected to involuntary commitment who
did not suffer from one of the major mental illnesses such as schizophrenia,
major affective depression, or bipolar disorder. Although a psychiatric hospital would be medically appropriate for some people suffering from the major
mental illnesses, it would offer scarce little therapeutic benefit for individuals
with behavioral problems or "conditions" that fell outside of these categories. 140 Several forms of mental health treatment - counseling, behavioral
therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and psychotherapy - may be helpful
for people with behavioral problems. However, such treatment typically can
be provided in community facilities on an outpatient basis, and does not re4
quire inpatient hospitalization. 1
People with such behavioral problems may act in ways we disapprove of,
and sometimes will cause harm to others. But, unless they also suffer from a
talization fosters deterioration, institutionalization, and possible regression."); Winick, Ambiguities, supra note 124, at 583.
137. See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND
DEATH (1975); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
(1980); Lynn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978); Robert F. DeVellis, Learned Helplessness in Institutions, 15 MENTAL RETARDATION 10 (1977); Steven F. Maier & Martin E. P. Seligman,

Learned Helplessness: Theory and Evidence, 105 J.EXPERIMENTAL

PSYCHOL.

33 (1976); J.

Bruce Overmier & Martin E. Seligman, Effects of Inescapable Shock Upon Subsequent Escape
and Avoidance Responding, 63 J. COMP. & PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 28 (1967); Martin E. P.

Seligman, Learned Helplessness, 23 ANN. REV. MED. 407 (1972); see also SHARON S. BREHM
& JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 378
(1981) (discussing learned helplessness theory); LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
(1979) (applying learned helplessness theory to the battered woman syndrome); Christopher

Peterson & Lisa M. Bossio, Learned Helplessness, in

SELF-DEFEATING BEHAVIORS: EXPERI-

235 (1989); Jerry
W. Thornton & Paul D. Jacobs, Learned Helplessness in Human Subjects, 87 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 367 (1971); Winick, Ambiguties, supra note 124, at 584.
138. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980); Report of the Task Panel on Public
MENTAL RESEARCH, CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS, AND PRACTICAL IIMPLICATIONS

Attitudes and Use of Media for Promotion of Mental Health, in IV
MITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH

TASK PANEL REPORTS SUB-

864, 1870 (1978); Winick, Am-

biguities, supra note 124, at 584.
139. See Kelly E. Piner & Lynn R. Kable, Adapting to the Stigmatizing Label of Mental
Illness: Foregone but not Forgotten, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 806 (1984);
Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implicationsfor Mental

Health Law, I PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y

& L. 6, 13-23 (1995) [hereinafter Incompetency Labeling];

see also Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanisms in Human Agency, 37 AM.
122 (1982); Winick, Ambiguities, supra note 124, at 584
140. Winick, Ambiguities, supra note 124, at 558-60, 562-66.
141. Id. at 575-77.
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major mental illness, their "condition" will not render them incompetent to
engage in rational decision-making about the value of choosing to engage in
mental health treatment. 142 They may have behavioral problems, but those
problems will not produce cognitive impairment, at least of a serious kind. In
short, they should not be deemed to be of "unsound mind."
To the extent there are police power reasons justifying an intrusion on
their liberty to protect the safety of others, this purpose should be accomplished by means other than civil commitment to a psychiatric hospital. Because they do not suffer from mental illnesses that prevent them from
controlling their behavior, 4 3 we should deal with their antisocial conduct
through the criminal law. Unless the individual suffers from a condition of the
kind that would make psychiatric hospitalization clinically appropriate, the
prevention of conduct dangerous to others should not justify confinement in a
psychiatric facility. Use of the mental hospital to isolate individuals from society for the purposes of community protection, or to warehouse those whose
conduct or appearance is perceived as offensive or threatening to others,
should be deemed inappropriate unless supported by a genuine therapeutic justification. Mental hospitals should not be used as prisons or as facilities for
the confinement of dangerous individuals. Rather, their use should be limited
to individuals suffering from mental illness, defined narrowly, who are able to
experience the medical benefits such hospitals can provide. Moreover, requiring hospitals to house individuals who are not mentally ill in this sense can
drain away scarce clinical resources from those who could most benefit from
them, disrupt the treatment of other patients, and have a strongly antitherapeutic effect on the staff of such facilities, discouraging good clinicians from
choosing to work there.
A narrower conception of the nature and degree of mental illness that
would warrant involuntary hospitalization would not only protect liberty from
arbitrary deprivation - the purpose of Article 5 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - but also
would seem therapeutically beneficial. Involuntary hospitalization should be
reserved for those who are seriously, mentally ill and could benefit from psychiatric hospitalization and treatment. Those who are not mentally ill in this
sense, but are given a variety of labels because of their antisocial or maladap44
tive behavior, are simply not appropriate for mental hospitalization.'
142. Id. at 569.
143. See ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMOUNG Us 60 (1993) (discussing psychopaths); Winick, Ambiguities, supra note
124, at 568-69 (discussing antisocial personality disorder); id. at 579-82 (discussing personality
disorders, conditions once labeled neurosis, and the impulse control and sexual disorders).
144. Contra Anderson v. The Scottish Ministers, PC (31st July 2000) [2001] UKPC D5. In
this case, several convicted murderers were committed pursuant to an amendment to Scotland's
Mental Health Law authorizing civil commitment of persons with "psychopathic personality
disorder." Without analysis, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council assumed that this
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The Winterwerp case can be seen as beginning a movement in this direction, but the limits it placed on the concept of "unsound mind" did not go far
enough. Developing international human rights law should go further and impose additional restrictions on civil commitment. The MI Principles point the
way, and should be used to construe the vague concept of "unsound mind" in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
C. ProceduralRequirements for Civil Commitment
Article 5 (1)(e) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms also requires that civil commitment must
occur "in accordance with the procedures prescribed by law."' 45 In addition,
Article 5(4) provides that a person "deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the
detention is not lawful."' 146 Winterwerp challenged his detention under both
of these provisions.
In construing Article 5 (1) (e), the court noted that the phrase "procedure
prescribed by law" refers to the procedures required by domestic law, and that
the provision simply requires compliance with that law. 147 Although the European Court of Human Rights has the jurisdiction to review whether domestic
law has been followed, the proper interpretation of domestic law is a matter
for the domestic courts.' 48 Deferring to the interpretation of its law by the
Netherlands courts in several respects, the Winterwerp court rejected several
of his procedural claims and found that he was detained "in accordance with
49
the procedure prescribed by law."'
Winterwerp also raised several procedural claims under Article 5 (4).1 50
He argued that neither the official who made the initial decision to detain him,
nor the public prosecutor who repeatedly continued his detention, possessed
the characteristics of a court, as required by Article 5 (4).I5 1 The European
Court of Human Rights agreed that these administrative officials were not
courts within the meaning of the Convention, which contemplated bodies that
are "independent both of the executive and of the parties to the case."15 2 Even
though the reviewing courts that approved his continued detention were courts
in this sense, the Winterwerp court noted that Article 5 (4) would be satisfied
condition constituted "unsound mind," and rejected their contention that their commitment violated Article 5(l)(e) of the Convention.
145. Gostin, supra note 84, at 140.
146. Convention, supra note 83, at § 5(4).
147. Id.

148. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 405 (1979).
149. Id.

150. Convention, supra note 83, at § 5(4).
151. Id.

152. Winterwerp, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 405.
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only if "the procedure followed has a judicial character and gives to the individual concerned guarantees appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in
question." 153
The court concluded that "it is essential that the person concerned should
have access to a court and the opportunity be heard either in person or, where
necessary, through some form of representation, failing which he will not be
afforded 'the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty.' "154 The court noted that "mental illness may entail restricting or modifying the manner of exercise of such a right, but it cannot justify
impairing the very essence of the right."'' 55 Because neither the district nor the
reviewing courts, under the domestic law in force at the time, were obliged to
hear the individual detained, and because Winterwerp was never notified of
the proceedings nor of their outcome, and was not heard by these courts, the
court found that Article 5 (4) was not satisfied.' 56 Although Winterwerp was
provided a hearing before the reviewing court on his initial application for
release in 1969, his subsequent requests for release in 1971, 1972, and 1973,
were rejected by the public prosecutor as without merit and not forwarded to
the regional court. 5 7 While the public prosecutor gave Winterwerp a hearing
at these points, these could not qualify as decisions taken by a court within the
mandate of Article 5 (4).158

The Winterwerp court thus took seriously the Convention's commitment
to a fair judicial process for determining the need for detention on the basis of
mental illness. But Winterwerp was an easy case in this regard. It involved
the total deprivation of a judicial hearing and of notice of the application for
continued detention. The case, therefore, did not provide the court with an
opportunity to specify what further details, if any, such a hearing would need
to provide. Plainly, the hearing would need to comply with whatever domestic
law requires in this regard. But is more required? This is left to developing
principles of international human rights law.
Some further guidance on this point is provided by MI Principle 16,
which specifies that involuntary detention or retention shall be for a short period of observation and treatment, as specified by domestic law, "pending review of the detention or retention by the review body."' 59 MI Principle 16
also provides that "the grounds for the admission shall be communicated to the
patient without delay and the fact of the admission and the grounds for it shall
153. Id. at 408.
154. Id. at 409.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 409-410.
157. Id. at 399-400.
158. The court also rejected the government's contention that, because Winterwerp had the
opportunity to consult with counsel at various intervals, but never applied to the court through
counsel, he cannot complain that he was denied the opportunity to take proceedings before a
court. Id. at 411.
159. MI Principles, supra note 116.
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also be communicated promptly and in detail to the review body."' 60 Although it specifies additional details concerning the type of notice that is required and the promptness with which the hearing must be held, the MI
Principles tell us little about other safeguards that the hearing must provide.
In the 1981 case of X v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human
Rights reiterated Article 5 (4)'s requirement of judicial review, noting that
even when domestic law does not authorize periodic judicial review of continued detention, an individual detained is entitled "to take proceedings at intervals before a reviewing court to put in issue the 'lawfulness' of his
detention."' 6'1 In so doing, the court noted, "[I]t is not within the province of
the court to enquire into what would be the best or most appropriate system of
judicial review in this sphere, for the Contracting States are free to choose
different methods of performing their obligations."'' 6 2 Declaring that to be a
"court" within this requirement, the body in question must be independent of
the executive and the parties to the case, the court noted that it need not be "a
court of law of the classic kind," as long as it exhibits "the guarantees ('appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question') of (a] judicial procedure, the forms of which may vary from one domain to another."'' 63 One of
these essential safeguards is notice, and the X court held that to satisfy the
requirement, the individual must be "promptly and adequately informed of the
64
facts and legal authority relied on to deprive him of his liberty.'
Article 5, therefore, contemplates that the individual be accorded adequate notice, a fair hearing before an independent court designed to ascertain
whether the criteria under domestic law for involuntary hospitalization have
been satisfied, and an opportunity for periodic judicial review of continued
commitment. The specific safeguards provided at the hearing will, in the first
instance, be a matter of domestic law. Until the European Court of Human
Rights provides further clarification concerning the essential features of procedural fairness required, it will be up to domestic law to specify such details as
whether the individual is provided the right to counsel, to present evidence and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and how the burden of proof will be allocated. The requirement of a civil commitment hearing is designed to minimize
65
the risk of arbitrary deprivations of liberty, but also serves therapeutic ends.
Analysis of the procedural fairness of the commitment hearing, therefore,
should also be concerned with the impact on the individual's mental health of
the various safeguards provided at the hearing and how they are applied by the
judge, attorneys, and expert witnesses involved in it.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
X v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 188, 207 (1982).
Id. 53.
Id.

164. Id.

66.

165. See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of JudicialProcedures:
Implicationsfor Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433-45 (1992); Winick, Civil
Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 38.
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An important therapeutic jurisprudence insight is that, if properly conducted, the hearing can fulfill the individual's participatory or dignitary interest in ways that a body of literature on the psychology of procedural justice
suggests would increase the efficacy of any hospitalization and treatment that
is ordered.' 66 If domestic law provides for a series of procedural safeguards,
but they are applied in only a formal way by judges that rubberstamp the
conclusions of the clinical experts and by attorneys that relax their adversary
role in ways that make them appear to act in concert with the judge and
clinical experts to facilitate commitment, the effects on the patient may be
strongly antitherapeutic.1 67 Practices of this kind can make the commitment
hearing appear to the patient to be a farce and a mockery, a feeling that can
undermine the participatory or dignitary value of the hearing. Patients subjected to such a sham ritual will loose trust and confidence in the judge, lawyers, and clinicians involved in the hearing, and will become suspicious of the
genuineness of their purportedly benevolent intentions. Hearings of this kind
can violate the need of patients to be treated with respect, politeness, and dignity, and to feel that their rights as citizens are acknowledged. These feelings
can undermine their sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy, which can exacerbate their mental illness and foster a form of learned helplessness. 168 They
may also have a significantly adverse impact on the ability of patients to respond successfully to hospitalization and treatment. By contrast, according
patients a fair hearing that satisfies their need to be treated with dignity and
respect can facilitate the goals of commitment, should it be ordered.
The literature on the psychology of procedural justice shows that such
treatment increases litigant satisfaction and compliance with the outcome of
the hearing. 169 Properly administered, the hearing can increase the patient's
sense of trust and confidence in the judicial and mental health systems, and
make it more likely that he or she will accept the outcome of the commitment
hearing and respond more effectively to hospitalization. Properly performed,
the hearing can also play an important educational role, and provide the patient
with a degree of information control, facilitating his or her ability to deal with
the stress of the commitment hearing and hospitalization. 170 The information
given at the hearing can provide individuals with an opportunity to comprehend what is happening to them, enabling them to understand the reasons for
commitment and the positive expectations that the judge and clinicians testifying at the hearing have concerning the outcome of hospitalization. Moreover,
subjecting patients to a sham hearing at which they feel betrayed by their own
lawyers and the judge can increase the feeling that they are being coerced. By
contrast, treating them with dignity and respect and recognizing their need for
166. Id.
167. Id. at 43.
168. Id. at 45.
169. Tyler, supra note 165.
170. Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 58.
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voice, the ability to tell their stories, and validation, the feeling that what they
have to say is being taken seriously, may enable them to avoid the negative
effects of coercion and even allow them to feel that they have voluntarily
chosen hospitalization.17 1 This conclusion is supported by research conducted
by the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law, which
found that patient perceptions of coercion are strongly associated with a degree to which the process accorded was seen to be characterized by procedural
justice. 7 2 This research found that people feel they have not been coerced,
even in coercive situations like civil commitment, when they perceive the intentions of governmental actors to be benevolent and they are treated with
dignity and respect.
This research is especially significant when considered in connection
with a body of theoretical work on the psychology of choice that suggests
people perform more effectively and with greater motivation when they
choose voluntarily to do something, and perform less effectively, with poor
motivation and sometimes with psychological reactance, when they feel coerced into doing it. 173 Principles of cognitive and social psychology, including
the goal setting effect, expectancy theory, intrinsic motivation, psychology of
commitment, and cognitive dissonance in general, support the positive value
of choice and the negative effects of perceived coercion. Recent empirical
work confirms the conclusion that patients will respond more effectively to
174
hospitalization if accorded the benefits of procedural justice.
In light of the therapeutic value of according patients procedural justice at
the commitment hearing, therapeutic jurisprudence would suggest the need for
restructuring the role of the various actors at the hearing. Judges, lawyers, and
clinicians need to understand the potential they have for applying the law therapeutically, and should restructure their behavior in order to realize this potential. They need to heed the lessons of the MacArthur work on coercion, and
reframe their practices in ways that produce in the patient feelings of noncoercion. They need to make patients feel that they are being treated fairly,
with dignity and respect, and accord to them a greater sense of voice and
validation.
The role of counsel, in particular, needs to be played with sensitivity to
these therapeutic considerations. Lawyers need to be aware of the literature on
the psychology of procedural justice, the MacArthur research on coercion, and
the literature on the psychology of choice. They also need to understand the
171. Id. at 45.
172. Charles W. Lidz et al., Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures
and Process, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1034, 1034-39 (1995); Bruce J. Winick, Coercion
and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 1145, 1158 (1997) [hereinafter Coercion].
173. See Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 48; BRUCE J. WINICK, THE
RIGHT To REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT ch. 17 (1997); Winick, Coercion, supra note
172, at 1161.
174. Michele Cascardi et al., Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: An
Analogy Study, 18 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 731-40 (2000).
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work of the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law on
competency, which demonstrates that many people with mental illness, even
schizophrenia, are capable of decision-making about mental health treatment
within a relatively normal range. 175 Attorneys, therefore, should play the adversarial role that procedural requirements contemplate, familiarizing themselves fully with the facts of the case before the hearing, interviewing the
client and other witnesses, exploring available alternatives to commitment,
counseling the client about possible dispositions, attempting to negotiate an
alternative to commitment, protecting the client's rights at the hearing, and
engaging in advocacy at the hearing in accordance with whatever the client's
76
expressed wishes may be.'
As long as the client can evidence a consistent choice concerning hospitalization, and can justify it in ways that are not obviously irrational or otherwise the product of mental illness, the attorney should consider the client to be
competent and should respect his or her decision either to accept voluntary
admission or to oppose hospitalization. If the attorney believes that, under the
circumstances, commitment is likely to be ordered by the court and would be
appropriate for the client, he or she should recommend that course to the client. When the client agrees, the attorney should negotiate a form of voluntary
or non-protesting admission in lieu of commitment, when it is available.
When the client opposes admission, on the other hand, the attorney should
play the adversarial role contemplated by the right of the patient to protest
commitment, helping the client to achieve full participatory value from the
hearing process.
Judges and clinicians also need training to sensitize them to the potential
of the therapeutic roles they play so that their conduct can also enhance the
therapeutic potential of the commitment hearing.' 77 Judges play an especially
important symbolic role. The literature on the psychology of procedural justice shows that people place a high value on how they are treated by legal
authorities. Patients should be permitted to dress appropriately for the hearing,
rather than in hospital garb, as sometimes occurs. The judge should treat the
patient with respect and convey to the patient that the commitment process is
designed for his or her welfare and that he or she will be treated with fairness
and dignity.
The judge and the expert witness can provide the patient with an important sense of information control. By carefully and understandably conveying
to the patient information about the hearing process and what will occur at the
hospital if commitment is ordered, the judge can diffuse much of the stress
175. Applebaum & Grisso, supra note 110; Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and
MedicalTreatment, 19 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 149-174 (1995); Bruce J. Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 48.
176. Winick, Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 17, at 53-54.
177. Id. at 57.
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that the commitment process itself might produce. The judge and clinicians
should address the patient directly, and attempt to communicate in his or her
language, rather than in professional jargon.
If the expert witnesses recommend commitment, the reasons why this is
so should be explained in ways that are understandable and convincing to the
patient. A sense of optimism should be conveyed to the patient. Although the
clinician feels that the patient suffers from a mental illness, he or she should be
told that such an illness is likely to respond effectively to hospital treatment
within a reasonably brief period. The use of psychotropic medication and
other forms of treatment should be explained to the patient in ways that are
calculated to persuade him or her as to their value.
The judge should listen attentively to the patient and convey the impression that he or she is important and will be given full consideration. If the
judge concludes that commitment should be ordered, his or her decision
should be explained to the patient, and the patient should be given the opportunity to have any questions that he or she may have about hospitalization answered. Whenever possible, the treating clinician should not also function as
the expert witness testifying in favor of the patient's commitment. When this
happens, the patient can conclude that the clinician is an enemy, a feeling that
can seriously undermine the effectiveness of the clinician's treatment role.
If the hearing can be conducted in these ways, with sensitivity by the
judge, attorneys, and expert witnesses to these therapeutic considerations, it
can significantly increase the patient's perceptions of fairness, participation,
and dignity. According patients procedural justice can increase the likelihood
that they will accept the outcome of the hearing, will view that outcome as
being in their best interests, and will participate in the hospitalization and
treatment process in ways that will bring about better therapeutic results. If
hearings are held in this manner, they can more effectively achieve the goals
of hospitalization when it is necessary. Understood in this way, the requirement that patients be accorded notice and a fair opportunity to contest their
hospitalization can both minimize arbitrary deprivations of liberty and achieve
considerable therapeutic value.
D.

The Right to Appropriate Treatment

Winterwerp also asserted that Article 5 (1)(e) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms entails
"the right to appropriate treatment in order to ensure that he is not detained
longer than absolutely necessary."' 78 Asserting that the psychiatric sessions
he received at the hospital were "too short and infrequent," and that the medication administered "was unduly made up of tranquilizers," he claimed that his
right to treatment was violated. 179 The Winterwerp court dismissed this con178. Winterwerp v.The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 406 (1979).
179. Id.
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tention without analysis, concluding that a right to appropriate treatment cannot be derived from Article 5.1'°
Should international human rights law recognize a right to treatment?
Should an individual be permitted to be deprived of liberty based on mental
illness and detained in the hospital that provides no treatment or inadequate
treatment? Because the government in Winterwerp vigorously denied the patient's contention that he received inadequate treatment,' 8' the court's statement rejecting the existence of such a right under the Convention is a broad
dictum and may not constitute a rejection of a right to treatment on different
facts - when it is clear that no such treatment has been provided, or that the
treatment provided was inadequate.
The question of whether the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms should recognize a legally enforceable right to appropriate treatment, therefore, should be regarded as an open
one, Winterwerp notwithstanding. Because the essential protection provided
by Article 5 is a right against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, it should be read
to require, at least for patients who are treatable, a minimum level of treatment
tailored to their clinical needs. Otherwise, detention based upon mental illness
alone would seem to be an unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation of their
liberty. The MI Principles, which are persuasive but not binding, recognize a
right to appropriate treatment. MI Principle 8, Standard of Care 1, provides
that "[e]very patient shall have the right to receive such health and social care
as is appropriate to his or her health needs ....,,182
The purpose of civil commitment grounded in the government's parens
patriae power is to promote the best interests of individuals who, by reason of
their mental illness, are incompetent to make decisions about hospitalization
and treatment on their own behalf.' 83 As a result, hospitalization in a facility
that provides no or inadequate treatment tailored to the patient's needs would
frustrate this justification for commitment, rendering such commitment an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. When the patient can survive safely in the community, hospitalization based upon the patient's need for treatment in a facility
that fails to meet this need would constitute an unjustified infringement on his
84
or her liberty.'
When the justification for civil commitment is the government's police
power interest in protecting the community from his or her dangerousness, 85
the rationale for detaining the patient in a psychiatric hospital rather than a
prison or preventive detention facility also would seem to be the promise of
180.

i. at 406-407.

181. Id.
182.
183.
184.
Clause
185.

MI Principles, supra note 116, Principle 8, Standard of Care 1.
Winick, TJ Model, supra note 17.
See generally O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (construing Due Process
of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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treatment for the mental illness to reduce the risk of his or her dangerousness.
Otherwise, the use of a psychiatric hospital for this purpose, rather than a
prison or a humane detention facility, would impose unnecessary limits on the
individual's liberty and unnecessary stigma on the individual himself. Because treatment designed to reduce dangerousness can decrease the need for
further hospitalization, when treatment is available that would accomplish this
purpose; the failure to provide it would make the use of a psychiatric hospital
for this purpose an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
Some American courts have recognized the existence of a right to treatment in the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 186 In addition, many American states have provided for such a right as a
legislative matter. 18 7 The inclusion of a right to appropriate treatment in the
MI Principles reflects the absorption of this right into customary international
human rights law.
Recognition of such a right to appropriate treatment is also strongly supported by considerations of therapeutic jurisprudence. The mental health of
those institutionalized because of their mental illness would be substantially
improved by the provision of needed services. The mental illnesses typically
resulting in civil commitment - schizophrenia, major affective depression,
and bipolar disorder - respond effectively to the increasing variety of
psychotropic medications, 188 particularly if used in conjunction with other
therapeutic techniques, including individual and group therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, and various types of counseling, as well as a variety of social
interventions.
Depriving patients of these needed treatments when they can restore the
patient to a degree of functioning that will allow a return to community life not
only would make hospitalization an unjustified deprivation of their liberty, but
it could exacerbate their mental illness. Detention in a psychiatric hospital
without needed treatment that, if successful, would ameliorate suffering and
restore functioning would seem to be punitive, both as a legal matter and as a
matter of patient perception. Because those who have been subjected to civil
commitment have not been convicted of crime, it would offend principles of
justice to punish them. However, the perception of punishment that patients
hospitalized against their will would experience can also limit feelings of self186. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and
remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974) (due process imposes on mental disability institutions the following minimum standards: "(1) a humane
physical and psychological environment, (2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer
adequate treatment and (3) individualized treatment plans").
187. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459 (2002).
188. Winick, Ambiguities, supra note 124, at 559; Jack A. Grebb, Biological Therapies: In-

troduction and Overview, in 2

COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

1574, 1575 (Harold

I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 5th ed. 1989) (table 31.1-1 showing use of psychotropic
drugs for these diagnostic categories).
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determination and self-efficacy that might be essential to mental health, and
could produce learned helplessness,' 89 and an institutionalized personality
syndrome.' 90 It can also increase feelings of cynicism, resentment, distrust,
and other negative emotions associated with being coerced and unjustifiably
imprisoned, which can compromise the ability of future treatment to be
effective.
Any system of mental hospitalization must take as its goal the restoration
of the patient to as high a degree of functional normality as may be possible in
the circumstances. Institutionalization without needed treatment not only fails
to achieve this goal, but it substantially frustrates it. Unless hospitals are to be
converted into prisons or human warehouses, they must be provided with sufficient funding to enable a full range of adequate treatment interventions tailored to the patient's needs that can facilitate his or her improvement and
release within a reasonable period of time. The massive curtailment of liberty
that involuntary psychiatric hospitalization entails can be justified only if such
hospitalization is beneficial and not harmful to the mental health of those subjected to it. Societies that establish mental hospitals do so for putatively benevolent purposes. They must match their good intentions regarding those
with mental illness with the commitment of adequate resources to allow
mental hospitals to provide their essential function - the treatment of the
patient. If a psychiatric hospital lacks adequate resources to provide a sufficient level of treatment to patients in need, or denies available treatment resources to such patients, it cannot fulfill this essential purpose.
Therapeutic jurisprudence considerations thus converge with the value
that international human rights law principles place upon liberty and justice to
favor a right of institutionalized patients to appropriate treatment. While international human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights,
may not be able to order that more funds be spent to provide additional clinical
resources at psychiatric hospitals which lack adequate levels of treatment services, they can and should adjudicate that patients detained in such facilities
who are denied treatment have thereby suffered an arbitrary deprivation of
their liberty, and therefore order their release. While the Winterwerp court
declined to find such a right to treatment to be protected by the European
Convention, at least on the facts before it, in an appropriately egregious case
involving detention in a psychiatric hospital without treatment, it should not
hesitate to do so.
E.

Automatic Divestiture of Right to Administer Property upon
Civil Commitment

Winterwerp's final contention was that the automatic divestiture of his
right to administer his own property that he experienced under Dutch law upon
189. Winick, Incompetency Labeling, supra note 139.
190. GOFEMAN, supra note 136.
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being civilly committed constituted a violation of his civil rights under Article
6 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.' 9 1 Article 6 (1) provides: "In the determination of
his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."' 192 The European Court of
Human Rights agreed with this contention, finding that the "capacity to deal
personally with one's property" is a civil right within the protection of Article
6 (1).19 3 The Court noted that the civil commitment hearing given to
Winterwerp following his initial detention was concerned solely with the deprivation of his liberty, and therefore, could not be deemed to meet the separate
requirements of Article 6 (1) for a fair hearing "on the question of his civil
94
capacity." 1
The Court's decision constitutes a rejection of the conception that "unsound mind" or mental illness always and automatically renders an individual
incompetent to engage in rational decision-making. This had been the conception of mental illness that prevailed in the 19th Century. 195 This conception
has been rejected by our advancing understanding of the nature of mental ill96
ness and by the thrust of modern mental health law reform. 1
Recent research on treatment competency conducted by the MacArthur
Research Network on Mental Health and the Law demonstrates that the
Winterwerp court's approach was correct. 19 7 The MacArthur study shows
that, although the decision-making capacity of people with mental illness is
sometimes severely impaired, they are not always incompetent to make rational treatment decisions, and by extension, other decisions as well. This
research, the most sophisticated and thorough attempt to study the issue ever
undertaken, 98 demonstrates the need for individualized determinations of the
competency question, rather than across-the-board presumptions that mental
illness equates with incompetency to make various kinds of decisions.
By requiring a separate hearing to address the question of a patient's
competence to manage his property, rather than presuming incompetence in
this regard based upon satisfaction of civil commitment criteria, the
Winterwerp court struck a blow for individual autonomy. The court's approach in effect erects a presumption in favor of competency, and the ability
of an individual with mental illness to manage his own property and otherwise
191. Winterwerp v. The Netherlands, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 387, 413-14 (1979).
192. Id. at 412.
193. Id. at 390.
194. Id. at 414.
195. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110,
at 152.
197. See supra note 175 and accompanying text; Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110
(analyzing the study and its legal and policy implications).
198. Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110, at 158.
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make decisions on his own behalf. Unless found to be incompetent, following
a fair hearing to engage in the specific kind of decision-making in question,
the patient may not be deprived of other civil rights. These include not only
the right to manage one's own property, but also the right to contract, to make
a will, to vote, to marry, and to have custody of one's children.
This approach, in addition to promoting individual liberty, is supported
by principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Psychiatric hospitals too often have
conditioned passivity and helplessness in their patients by reinforcing it and by
discouraging assertiveness and autonomous behavior. 199 Mental patients too
often have been infantilized by the treatment they receive from institutional
clinicians and staff.2°° Treating patients as incompetent objects of paternalism
may strongly reinforce feelings of incompetence, hopelessness, and diminished self-esteem and self-efficacy, destroying intrinsic motivation and even
producing the syndrome of learned helplessness. 20 1 When others make decisions that significantly affect the individual, such as the management of his or
her own property without the individual's participation, the resulting disuse of
decision-making powers may lead to further degeneration of existing capabilities and behaviors. 20 2 Treating even institutionalized patients as incompetent
to make decisions in other areas of their lives can actually promote psychological dysfunction. Exercising self-determination is a basic human need. 20 3 Allowing individuals to make choices for themselves is intrinsically motivating,
whereas denying choice undermines their motivation, learning, and general
sense of well-being. 2°4 The approach reflected in the Winterwerp decision
can, therefore, do much to limit these antitherapeutic and dysfunctional effects
that mental patients have been subjected to for too long.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

THERAPEUTICALLY TO REMEDY ABUSES IN THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM OF EASTERN EUROPE

Do the abuses in the mental health system of Hungary and other Eastern
European nations discussed in the Introduction to this Article violate the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? Do they violate the principles reflected in the Winterwerp case, the
most important one construing the Convention? Can international human
rights lawyers use these tools to attack these practices?
199. Id. at 160.
200. Id.
201. Id. n.129; see also ELLEN J.

LANGER, MINDFULNESS

5 (1989); DeVellis, supra note 136;

Winick, Incompetency Labeling, supra note 139.
202. Winick, MacArthur Study, supra note 110, at 161; Bruce D. Sales & Lynn R. Kahle,
Law and Attitudes Toward the Mentally II, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391, 392 (1980).
203. Id.; EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 208 (1980) (discuss-

ing intrinsic motivation).
204. Id. at 209 (discussing studies).
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Locked bed cages would seem to constitute an arbitrary deprivation of
liberty in violation of Article 5 (1) (e) of the Convention. Although patients
committed to psychiatric hospitals or social care homes have already been
deprived of their liberty generally, locking them up in bed cages constitutes an
additional and especially severe deprivation of their liberty. If done every
night without a particularized showing of need, it would seem to be highly
arbitrary. Moreover, as a separate deprivation of liberty, this practice should
be permitted, if at all, only following a fair hearing. Even if domestic law
makes no provision for such an additional hearing, Article 5 (4) of the Convention would seem to require such a hearing before an independent court
which would give the patient the opportunity to protest this added deprivation
of liberty.
Locking patients up in bed cages should never be permitted. If a patient
is acting violently toward other patients or staff the problem should be dealt
with by appropriately trained hospital personnel, and in appropriate circumstances, through the use of a brief period of seclusion or restraint. 20 5 Insufficient staff should not justify the use of locked bed cages any more than it
would justify the use of chains or excessive administration of psychotropic
medication to tranquillize patients in order to make them more manageable.
Not only are locked bed cages an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, they also are
highly antitherapeutic. Patients locked up each night in this way for reasons
unrelated to their conduct, will inevitably have feelings of powerlessness, lowered self-esteem and self-efficacy, and depression, and are likely to experience
a form of learned helplessness. Treating people in this way also will likely
produce feelings of resentment, anger, and distrust of hospital staff that can
seriously undermine the effectiveness of whatever treatment they are offered.
Psychiatric facilities that, because of inadequate staff and clinical resources, use locked bed cages, unmodified electroconvulsive therapy as punishment, or excessive psychotropic medication for management purposes also
would seem to violate the right to appropriate treatment that I have argued
Article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms should be read to protect.2 0 6 Similarly, psychiatric facilities that provide unsanitary living conditions containing rooms that smell of
urine and feces, overcrowded and inadequate living facilities that deprive patients of needed privacy, and inadequate or inappropriate psychotropic medication or other treatment should be deemed to violate their patients' right to
205. See MI Principles, supra note 116, Principle I I("[P]hysical restraint or involuntary se-

clusion of the patient shall not be employed except in accordance with the officially approved
procedures of the mental health facility, and only when it is the only means available to prevent
immediate or imminent harm to the patient or others. It shall not be prolonged beyond the
period which is strictly necessary for this purpose.").
206. See supra Part HID; see also MI Principles, supra note 116, Principle 8, Standard of

Care I (right to receive appropriate health and social care); id. at Principle 8, Standard of Care 2
("Every patient shall be protected from harm, including unjustified medication ... or other acts
causing mental distress or physical discomfort.").
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appropriate treatment. Facilities that are so underfunded and understaffed that
they cannot meet the clinical needs of their patients and use abusive practices
that can further exacerbate their mental illness and cause them psychological
damage, cannot fulfill the therapeutic promise that serves as the justification
for civil commitment. Detention of patients in such facilities, therefore,
should be condemned as an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of
Article 5 (1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.
In addition, the practice of appointing plenary guardians with the power
to commit their wards to psychiatric hospitals or social care homes also should
be considered to violate Article 5 (1) of the Convention. Unless such patients
themselves voluntarily consent to their admission to such facilities and are
competent to do so, such commitment by guardians would constitute a deprivation of their liberty. When domestic law sanctions this practice, it constitutes a governmental deprivation of liberty20 7 that would need to be justified
on the ground of "unsound mind" as that term was construed in Winterwerp
and as developing principles of international human rights law may come to
define it.208
The guardian alone should not be permitted to make the determination
that the ward suffers from "unsound mind" of a kind or degree that would
warrant involuntary detention; rather, in accordance with Articles 5(1)(e) and
5(4) of the Convention, this determination should be made by a court that
provides the individual with a fair procedural opportunity to protest his or her
detention. Even if domestic law authorizes such a guardianship process, and
compliance with it is therefore deemed to satisfy the requirements of Article 5
(1) (e), the patient still would possess the right under Article 5 (4) to protest
his detention at a hearing before an independent court. The guardianship process, producing the functionally identical deprivation of liberty as civil commitment, should not be permitted to circumvent Article 5's substantive and
procedural requirements for such a deprivation of liberty. Let us recall that it
was Winterwerp's wife who initially had him admitted to a mental hospital.
As his wife, she presumably had his best interests at heart and was functioning
as a sort of guardian. Yet, she alone could not effectuate his admission to a
mental hospital, however justified that might have been. As the court held in
Winterwerp, there also needed to be judicial review of the basis for his commitment and an opportunity for him to protest his admission at a fair hearing
held before an independent court. 20 9 The guardian cannot be deemed to be an
independent court within the meaning of Article 5. If appointed by the state,
the guardian would be an administrative official who, like the public prosecu207. Nielsen v. Denmark, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 193 (1988) (hospitalization of a minor by his
mother held not to implicate Article 5 (1) of the Convention, which is limited to deprivations of
liberty by the authorities of the state).
208. See supra Part II.B.

209. See supra Part III.C.
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tor in Winterwerp, would not be deemed sufficiently independent of the politi2
cal process to be considered a court within the meaning of Article 5. 10 If
appointed by the patient for some purpose other than commitment, perhaps
through an advance directive instrument or irrevocable power, the guardian
still would not meet the definition of a court within Winterwerp's construction
of Article 5 because the guardian would not be independent of the parties, one
21
of whom would be the patient. '
Even if the guardian was appointed by the court, as a result, for example,
of the patient's incompetence to manage his or her property, this should not
authorize the guardian to effectuate the patient's civil commitment without an
additional judicial hearing. Winterwerp's holding that the automatic deprivation of the patient's right to manage his own property as a result of his civil
commitment constituted a violation of Article 6 (1) of the Convention would
seem applicable in this context. 212 The court's decision in this regard represents a rejection of the concept of total incompetency resulting from mental
illness. A determination that an individual is incompetent to manage his own
property and requires the appointment of a guardian to act on his behalf in this
regard cannot, consistent with Winterwerp, constitute a determination that his
or her mental illness is of such a nature or degree as to warrant involuntary
detention. A determination that an individual lacks competency in one area of
functioning does not justify a presumption that he or she also is incompetent in
another regard. Under Winterwerp, there must be a separate hearing on the
question. The concept of plenary guardianship thus seems wholly at odds with
the approach of Winterwerp.
Allowing guardians to effectuate hospital admissions without a hearing
therefore should be deemed to violate the procedural protections of Article 5
of the Convention. Moreover, this practice would frustrate the therapeutic jurisprudence need for participatory and dignitary values to be respected in the
commitment process. 21 3 The patient will experience feelings of being sold out
by the guardian, if the guardian is a trusted friend or relative, and even if the
guardian is a public official appointed to act on the patient's behalf in furtherance of his or her best interests. This feeling will provoke a sense of distrust
in the legal and mental health system, and increase feelings of coercion, both
of which will undermine the potential efficacy of hospitalization and treatment. 2 ' 4 Moreover, if the guardianship admission process is permitted to deprive the patient of the right to have a hearing to protest his or her detention,
denying the patient the sense of "voice" and "validation" that seem essential to
litigant satisfaction and compliance with judicial determinations, and creating
the feeling that he or she has been dealt with unfairly, the potential for a suc210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See id.
See id.
See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.C.
Id.
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cessful adjustment to hospitalization and response to hospital treatment can be
seriously diminished. Being treated in this way can also exacerbate the patient's sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy and produce feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, and depression that can be psychologically damaging.
Thus, many of the abusive practices in the mental health system of EastEurope
can be understood to violate the European Convention for the Proern
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other evolving
principles of international human rights law. The Winterwerp case and the
policies it reflects, properly understood, condemn these abuses. International
human rights lawyers should attack these practices, bringing them to public
attention and seeking judicial redress from both domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights.
The remedy for the abuses in the mental health system of Hungary and
other Eastern European nations is a healthy dose of international human rights
law and therapeutic jurisprudence. As that region moves from a medical, to a
legal, to a therapeutic jurisprudence model of civil commitment, we can expect
to see reforms in mental health law and practice that will both protect individual liberty and promote improved mental health and psychological well-being.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and other evolving principles of international human rights law
will do much to spur this movement toward reform. Bringing the rule of law
to the mental hospital will do much to limit abuses, and bringing therapeutic
jurisprudence to mental health law and practice in Eastern Europe and to our
construction of international human rights principles will do much to reshape
law and practice in this area into a more effective tool for promoting the
mental health of patients. A therapeutic jurisprudence model for civil commitment can do much to convert the mental health system in Eastern Europe into
a more humane and therapeutic one that can provide help to those suffering
from mental illness without in the process harming them.

